# SILO vs. MinIO Behavior Changes

> Complete user-visible compatibility, takeover, authorization, S3, storage, replication, batch, CLI, and Console changes from the MinIO fork baseline through SILO 20261112.

---

LLMS index: [llms.txt](/llms.txt)

---

**Standard S3 applications usually switch from MinIO to SILO without code changes, and modern `xl` / `xl-single` data volumes mount in place without rewriting object data.** However, migrating from upstream MinIO to SILO requires a **coordinated full-cluster stop** (mixed-version rolling replacement across the product boundary is unsupported), and security and consistency repairs deliberately tighten deployment identity, IAM policy evaluation, request signing, Object Lock, multi-pool mutations, and background jobs.

> [!IMPORTANT] Current audited baseline: SILO 20261112
> This guide covers every user-perceivable behavior change from the upstream fork baseline [`minio/minio@27742d469462`](https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/27742d469462e1561c776f88ca7a1f26816d69e2) (`2025-12-03`, after the final upstream tag `RELEASE.2025-10-15T17-29-55Z`) through **[SILO Server 20261112](/blog/release/silo-20261112/)** (`RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z`, source [`44e848fedf8c`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/commit/44e848fedf8cec3d8c0da4b1aa8422390a2b7a8b), embedding **[Console v2.7.2](/blog/release/console-2.7.2/)** [`0e7953ff59c4`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo-console/commit/0e7953ff59c4a1eb77c7d203b265e6783ff18d01), paired with **[mcli 20261112](/blog/release/mcli-20261112/)** [`a37a9f054fba`](https://github.com/pgsty/mc/commit/a37a9f054fba828a0bbbceb4e9ff247ccf09c28d), `silo-pkg v3.16.1`, Helm chart `7.0.5`, and Go `1.27.4`). For the 24-category executive index, see the [Compatibility Overview](/compatibility/); for step-by-step cutover commands, see the [Migration Guide](/compatibility/migration/).


- [In\-Place Takeover Matrix](#takeover) (Start Here) — See whether existing MinIO data drives mount directly, which topologies require a full stop, and what rollback requires.
- [Check by Starting Version](#by-version) (4 Paths) — Filter the exact upgrade gates for Upstream MinIO, SILO 202608–09, SILO 20260916–1026, or SILO 20261109.
- [12\-Surface Behavior Reference](#deployment) (Full Diff) — Inspect concrete changes across deployment, IAM, S3 authz, encryption, multipart, replication, pools, ILM, batch, mcli, and Console.
- [Cutover \& Rollback Steps](#upgrade) (5 Steps) — Run pre-cutover drains, offline backups, policy audits, per-node S3 data-path checks, and consistent rollback preparation.


## Can an Existing MinIO Cluster Run Directly on SILO? {#takeover}

When evaluating an in-place takeover, separate three distinct questions: **whether SILO reads existing disks**, **whether nodes can be swapped one by one while serving traffic**, and **whether existing policies, integrations, and background jobs keep identical semantics afterward**:

| Scenario or Boundary                                                                                  | Verdict                                            | Behavior on SILO 20261112                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Operational Requirement                                                                                                                                |
| :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Modern single-drive (`xl-single`) and distributed (`xl`) data volumes                                 | **Direct Mount**   | `.minio.sys/format.json` and XL metadata headers remain compatible; existing objects, versions, multipart uploads, encryption headers, and stored IAM records load in place without rewriting object data                           | Inspect `.minio.sys/format.json` read-only (`xl` or `xl-single`) and confirm healthy read quorum across all erasure sets before stopping old processes |
| Legacy `fs` or `gateway` directories                                                                  | **Unsupported**     | Removed upstream in `2022-10-29`; SILO rejects legacy `fs` directories at startup (note: modern single-directory `server /data` uses `xl-single`, which mounts directly)                                                            | Migrate data via object export/mirror following the [FS/Gateway migration guide](/operations/deployments/baremetal-migrate-fs-gateway/)                |
| Mixed-binary rolling cluster (MinIO + SILO nodes running together)                                    | **Blocked**         | Distributed bootstrap verifies peer binary checksums, private internode StorageREST removed `/rmpl` (`ReadMultiple`), and peer IAM/replication protocols advanced                                                                   | Cut over from upstream MinIO to SILO as a **coordinated full-cluster stop**, never node-by-node mixed binaries                                         |
| Single pool whose erasure sets span different host subsets (typically ≥ 18 hosts in automatic layout) | **Full Stop**      | Pre-`20261109` processes routed single-pool locks to erasure set 0 instead of the target set; mixed old/new processes use disjoint lock domains and lose mutual exclusion                                                           | Drain traffic and stop every old process before starting `20261109` or later                                                                           |
| Multi-pool cluster rolling between SILO releases                                                      | **Drain Writes**   | Cross-pool conditional writes, lock ordering, bulk version purges, and suspended-bucket `null`-version lock checks require all nodes on `20261112` for uniform guarantees                                                           | Drain or pause concurrent S3 writes across mixed-version multi-pool rolling windows                                                                    |
| Multi-site replication and shared IAM cutover                                                         | **Coordinated**    | Durable IAM revocation tombstones (`20260916+`) and tri-state service-account inline policies (`20261112`) can be overwritten if an unupgraded peer site edits accounts and resyncs                                                 | Avoid editing service accounts or IAM policies on old sites during mixed-site rollouts; reconcile policies after all sites upgrade                     |
| Unfinished Batch jobs (`expire`, `replicate`, `keyrotate`)                                            | **Drain First**    | `20261109+` writes submitter-bound `SILO-BATCH` v2 manifests and reports; legacy running/queued/paused jobs are not guaranteed to resume across the boundary, and `≤ 20261026` rejects v2 records                                   | Stop new batch submissions, let active jobs finish or cancel them before upgrading, and resubmit once all nodes run `20261112`                         |
| Native S3 archive restore (`POST ?restore`)                                                           | **All Nodes**      | Two-phase lock-free restore (`20261109+`) requires every peer in the cluster to advertise the capability and be reachable; otherwise `POST ?restore` returns `503`                                                                  | Upgrade all nodes and confirm peer connectivity before running archive restores                                                                        |
| Custom IAM policies, OIDC/LDAP, TLS/KMS, and notifications                                            | **Audit Config**      | Object-only ARNs no longer grant 12 bucket-level writes, version deletes require `s3:DeleteObjectVersion`, self-service password change checks `admin:ChangeMyPassword`, HMAC OIDC is rejected, and legacy DB notify requires a DSN | Audit representative policies and test login, KMS decryption, replication, and event targets before reopening client traffic                           |
| Swapping back to an older binary for rollback                                                         | **Backup Required** | Readable objects do not prove safe downgrade: startup, scanner passes, IAM revocations, Batch v2 manifests, and bucket tombstones update `.minio.sys` state that older binaries reject or misinterpret                              | Capture an offline consistent backup of `.minio.sys`, IAM exports, and deployment manifests before cutover; restore all peers together if rolling back |
{.matrix .wide .expand}

## Quick Check by Starting Version {#by-version}

Select your current running version to focus on the upgrade gates that apply directly to you; refer to the 12 domain tables below for full details.

**From Upstream MinIO \(≤ 2025\-10\-15\)**

Migrating directly from upstream MinIO (such as the final tag `RELEASE.2025-10-15T17-29-55Z`) crosses every fork-era delivery and security boundary in one cutover:

- **Cutover mode and disk verification**: Confirm `.minio.sys/format.json` is `xl` or `xl-single`, capture an offline backup, and execute a **coordinated full-cluster stop** (do not mix MinIO and SILO nodes). See the documented [single-node migration case](/compatibility/migration/#single-node-case).
- **Deployment and artifact identity ([Section 1](#deployment))**: Switch images to `docker.io/pgsty/silo:RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z`, server binary/systemd unit to `silo`, and client package to `mcli`. Replace hard-coded `/usr/bin/minio` paths with `silo`. Preserve Helm resource names and explicitly pin `image.tag`. Remove `admin update`, `mcli update`, and SUBNET automation.
- **IAM policies and external authentication ([Section 2](#iam), [Section 3](#object-authorization))**:
  - Statements containing only `arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*` no longer grant 12 bucket-level write actions (`PutBucketPolicy`, `PutBucketLifecycle`, `DeleteBucket`, etc.); add bare `arn:aws:s3:::bucket` to the same statement.
  - Permanent deletes carrying `versionId` require `s3:DeleteObjectVersion`; `Allow s3:*` + `Deny s3:DeleteObject` policies must also add `Deny s3:DeleteObjectVersion`.
  - Self-service password updates check `admin:ChangeMyPassword` (the built-in `readonly` policy no longer permits self-service password changes). Policy writes enforce strict JSON decoding and reject bare ARN namespace prefixes.
  - OIDC rejects symmetric `client_secret` HMAC (`HS256/384/512`) tokens and RSA JWKs above 4096 bits. Configure `MINIO_API_TRUSTED_PROXIES` when trusting `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` / `Forwarded`.
- **Integrations and background jobs ([Sections 8–10](#bucket-config))**: Convert legacy PostgreSQL / MySQL notification settings to `connection_string` / `dsn_string`; review per-bucket CORS rules (now actively enforced); drain unfinished Batch jobs before stopping; verify signed S3 reads/writes against every node after startup.

**From SILO 20260804–20260903**

You have already crossed the `silo` / `mcli` rename and initial fork security gates (bare bucket ARNs, `DeleteObjectVersion`, OIDC asymmetric JWKS). Upgrading to `20261112` focuses on changes introduced since `20260916`:

- **IAM and password authorization ([Section 2](#iam))**: `20260916` split `admin:ChangeMyPassword` and introduced durable IAM revocation tombstones (follow the [IAM upgrade guide](/operations/replication/iam-upgrade/) across peer sites); `20261018` hardened delegated Admin escalation and root-derived credentials; `20261112` enforces strict policy JSON decoding and preserves service-account inline policies when omitted (`{}` resets to inheritance).
- **S3 tag headers and archive-member authorization ([Section 3](#object-authorization))**: Local and active-active proxied `GET`/`HEAD` responses omit `x-amz-tagging-count`, `X-Amz-Tagging`, and `X-Amz-Object-Lock-*` unless the caller holds the corresponding tag or lock read permission; ZIP member reads authorize the outer ZIP's stored tags without persisting an on-disk index.
- **Topology stop gates and background jobs ([Sections 6–10](#replication))**: Single-pool clusters spanning distinct host subsets across erasure sets (typically ≥ 18 hosts) require a **full stop** to align lock domains; drain or cancel unfinished Batch jobs before upgrading (`SILO-BATCH` v2 manifests); `POST ?restore` returns `503` while any peer is unupgraded; drain concurrent S3 writes across multi-pool rolling windows.
- **HTTP, TLS, and Console ([Sections 11–12](#operations))**: HTTP/1 request headers enforce an absolute read deadline; Go `1.27.4` and `-distroless` UBI CA roots apply; embedded Console advances to `v2.7.2` (cursor pagination, 10 UI languages, folder usage scans, tri-state inline-policy editor).

**From SILO 20260916–20261026**

When upgrading from the September or October releases to `20261112`, check these operational gates:

- **Deployments that enabled optional `20260916` `strict` multipart listing ([Section 5](#multipart))**: Retired in `20261018+` (ignored with a startup warning); `ListMultipartUploads` uses the default cache/exact-key path without durable enumeration across restarts.
- **Single-pool lock domains, Batch v2, and native restore (`20261109` gates)**:
  - Drain and stop every old process before starting `20261112` if a single pool's erasure sets do not all share the exact same host set (normally ≥ 18 hosts);
  - Drain or cancel all unfinished Batch jobs before upgrading and resubmit afterward (`≤ 20261026` rejects `SILO-BATCH` v2 manifests);
  - Native `POST ?restore` returns `503` until every peer runs `20261109+` and is reachable.
- **`20261112` authorization, lock, and multi-pool repairs**:
  - Service-account edits preserve existing inline policies when omitted and require explicit `{}` (or turning off **Restrict beyond user policy**) to restore inheritance — avoid editing service accounts on old peer sites during rollout;
  - Strict policy JSON decoding rejects unknown fields and trailing data across IAM, STS, bucket policies, Console, and `mcli`;
  - Every explicit-`VersionId` entry in `DeleteObjects` runs sequentially through the single-object path across all buckets, increasing latency for large version purges;
  - Locked `null` versions in versioning-suspended or prefix-excluded buckets are protected against ordinary overwrites and shadowed deletes; compressed+encrypted `Range` reads and cross-pool historical self-copies are repaired.

**From SILO 20261109 → 20261112**

`20261109` already includes single-pool lock-domain alignment, `SILO-BATCH` v2 manifests, and two-phase native restore. Upgrading to `20261112` focuses on these targeted deltas (see [20261112 upgrade notes](/blog/release/silo-20261112/#upgrade)):

- **Service-account inline-policy preservation and reset (SN-2026-025)**: Updating a service account or access key with an omitted/`null` policy preserves its existing inline policy (including pre-`20261111` empty deny-all inline policies); pass `{}` or `{"Statement":[]}` explicitly to clear the inline policy and restore inheritance. Do not edit service accounts on `20261109` peer sites during a mixed-site rollout.
- **Strict policy JSON and SSE-KMS context validation**: Server, Console `v2.7.2`, and `mcli 20261112` reject unknown JSON fields, trailing payloads, and empty `Principal: {}` in policy writes; invalid `X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption-Context` headers return `400 InvalidArgument` instead of `500`, while `keyrotate` persists KMS context and stream-rewrites legacy `XLV1` objects onto `XLV2`.
- **S3 tag headers, ZIP member authz, and signing bounds (SN-2026-022 / -023 / -024)**: Local and active-active proxied `GET`/`HEAD` responses omit `x-amz-tagging-count`, `X-Amz-Tagging`, and `X-Amz-Object-Lock-*` when tag or lock read permission is absent; tag-authorized reads preserve `5xx` storage errors on read-quorum failure instead of returning false `403` (`#294`); ZIP member reads verify outer ZIP tags in memory without mutating the object; authenticated `STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER` enforces the 15-minute skew window, and SigV4 rejects mismatched scope dates and > 64 KiB trailers.
- **Object Lock, bulk version deletes, and pools**: Versioning-suspended buckets protect locked `null` versions against overwrites and delete markers; `DeleteObjects` runs sequentially on all explicit-`VersionId` entries across all buckets; pause concurrent S3 writes across multi-pool rolling windows; fixes cover compressed+encrypted `Range` reads (`decryptSkip > 0`), cross-pool historical self-copy (`#343`), pre-`2024-04-28` `xl.meta` and `UsesDataDir` revision normalization (`#332`, `#344`), and decommission nested child-key rescans plus within-quorum offline-drive emptiness checks (`#334`).
- **Helm upgrade**: Pass `--set image.tag=RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z` explicitly when upgrading Helm chart `7.0.5` with `--reuse-values`.

## 1. Deployment, Artifacts, Identity & Outbound Services {#deployment}

| Scenario                                                 | Since                     | Previous Behavior → SILO Behavior                                                                                                                                                               | Impact & Action                                                                                                                                                           |
| :------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------ | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Packages, executables, and systemd unit                  | `20260806+`               | `minio` / `minio.service` / `/usr/local/bin/minio` → Server package, binary, and unit use `silo` (`silo.service`); client package and binary use `mcli`; no `/usr/bin/minio` alias is installed | Update startup scripts, health probes, and automation; see [Native Package Migration](/compatibility/binary/)                                                             |
| OS service user and environment file precedence          | `20260806+`               | Default account `minio-user` → Fresh package installs create `silo:silo`; `/etc/default/silo` takes precedence when present, falling back to `/etc/default/minio`                               | Keep existing data ownership or grant `silo:silo` access to drives, certs, and logs; avoid leaving conflicting settings in both env files                                 |
| Local configuration and TLS certificate fallback         | `20260806+`               | Fixed `~/.minio` → Fresh processes default to `~/.silo`, falling back to `~/.minio` when `~/.silo` is absent, and still checking `~/.minio/certs` when `~/.silo/certs` has no certs             | Pass `--config-dir` or `--certs-dir` explicitly in service units so an accidental empty `~/.silo` does not shadow legacy config                                           |
| Container image, entrypoint, and `-distroless` variant   | `20260806+` / `20261109+` | `minio/minio` with `/usr/bin/minio` → `docker.io/pgsty/silo` (classic UBI and `-distroless` variants); entrypoint translates argv `minio server ...`, but only `/usr/bin/silo` exists on disk   | Replace hard-coded `/usr/bin/minio` commands or probes with `silo`; `-distroless` omits a shell and `mcli`, so use `["CMD", "silo", "healthcheck", "ready"]`              |
| Helm chart upgrade and resource naming (`7.0.5`)         | `20260806+` / `20261112`  | Upstream `minio` chart names and security defaults → SILO chart defaults to `silo` resource names and non-root security context, and `--reuse-values` retains the old `image.tag`               | Pin `nameOverride`, `fullnameOverride`, `serviceAccount.name`, and `securityContext` when adopting existing PVCs, and pass `--set image.tag=RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z` |
| In-place self-update, SUBNET, telemetry, and Windows ZIP | `20260804+` / `20261026+` | `mc admin update`, `mc update`, SUBNET uploads, and seeded `play` alias → Online self-update, callhome, telemetry, and SUBNET are disabled with explicit errors; Windows archives use `.zip`    | Remove scheduled `update` and SUBNET jobs; roll out upgrades through packages, container images, or your orchestrator                                                     |
| TLS defaults and CA trust bundle                         | `20260903+` / `20261109+` | Older Go TLS defaults and broader roots → Uses Go `1.27.4` TLS defaults, and `-distroless` matches the UBI `ca-certificates` bundle (removing retired GlobalSign R2 and distrusted roots)       | Add custom/internal CA certificates under `certs/CAs/` and verify handshakes against KMS, OIDC, LDAP, etcd, webhooks, and replication peers                               |
| Go module embedding and shared library path              | `20260903+`               | Imported `github.com/minio/pkg/v3` → Server module remains `github.com/minio/minio`, while maintained source directly requires `github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3` (`v3.16.1`)                       | Affects only Go code that embeds internal server/shared packages directly; standard S3 SDK users are unaffected                                                           |
{.wide .expand}

## 2. Authentication, IAM, Policies & Proxy Trust {#iam}

| Scenario                                                                                                                    | Since                     | Previous Behavior → SILO Behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Impact & Action                                                                                                                                                              |
| :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------ | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 12 protected bucket-level writes require bare bucket ARN ([SN-2026-004](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-004))           | `20260804+`               | Object-only `arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*` granted bucket policy, lifecycle, replication, versioning, and delete-bucket writes → `PutBucketPolicy`, `DeleteBucketPolicy`, `PutBucketObjectLockConfiguration`, `PutBucketVersioning`, `PutReplicationConfiguration`, `PutBucketLifecycle`, `DeleteBucket`, `ForceDeleteBucket`, `PutBucketCors`, `DeleteBucketCors`, `PutBucketQOS`, and `PutInventoryConfiguration` require bare `arn:aws:s3:::bucket` in the same `Allow` statement | Add `"arn:aws:s3:::bucket"` alongside `"arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"` in provisioning policies (temporary compatibility escape hatch: `MINIO_API_LEGACY_BUCKET_RESOURCE_MATCH=on`) |
| User and group status changes split `Enable*` vs. `Disable*` ([SN-2026-009](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-009))       | `20260903+`               | `SetUserStatus` and `UpdateGroupStatus` always checked `Enable*` → Enabling checks `admin:EnableUser` / `admin:EnableGroup`; disabling checks `admin:DisableUser` / `admin:DisableGroup`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Grant `admin:DisableUser` and `admin:DisableGroup` to operator roles that suspend users or groups                                                                            |
| Self-service password change split from user creation                                                                       | `20260916+`               | `admin:CreateUser` covered both creating users and changing one's own password, and built-in `readonly` allowed self-service password change → Self-service password change checks `admin:ChangeMyPassword`, and built-in `readonly` no longer grants it                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Attach `admin:ChangeMyPassword` explicitly if read-only users must rotate their own passwords; see [Password Permissions](/compatibility/password-permissions/#migration)    |
| Tri-state service-account and access-key inline policies ([SN-2026-025](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-025))           | `20261112`                | Metadata-only edits omitting a policy could clear an inline restriction and widen the key back to full parent inheritance → Omitted/`null` policy preserves the existing inline policy (including pre-`20261111` empty deny-all inline policies); explicit `{}` or `{"Statement":[]}` removes it and restores inheritance; nonempty policies missing `Version` receive the default                                                                                            | Upgrade Console `v2.7.2` and `mcli 20261112`; do not edit service accounts on unupgraded peer sites during rollout, and review effective policies afterward                  |
| Strict policy JSON decoding and bare ARN rejection ([SN-2026-005](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-005))                 | `20260804+` / `20261112`  | Tolerated unknown JSON fields, trailing tokens, and bare `arn:aws:s3:::` prefixes → IAM named policies, service-account session policies, STS `Policy`, bucket policies, imports, and replication reject unknown fields, trailing payloads, empty `Principal: {}`, `NotPrincipal`, and bare ARN prefixes; stored IAM policies still load                                                                                                                                      | Fix typos in hand-written or templated policy JSON (such as `Conditions` or `Principals`) and validate policy bundles before importing                                       |
| Built-in policy override Reset                                                                                              | `20261026+`               | Deleting an overridden built-in policy (such as `readonly` or `readwrite`) could remove the record without restoring the native definition → Reset removes the override and immediately restores the native built-in policy while retaining in-use checks                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Overridden built-in policies can now be safely reset to factory defaults                                                                                                     |
| Policy merge `Deny` preservation and fail-closed partial load                                                               | `20261018+` / `20261109+` | Multi-policy deduplication or partial policy read failures could drop an explicit `Deny` → Policy merges preserve every explicit `Deny`, and unreadable attached policy records fail closed for affected requests                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | If previously permitted calls return `AccessDenied`, check attached policies for an explicit `Deny` that was previously masked                                               |
| Delegated Admin containment and root-derived protection ([SN-2026-017](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-017))            | `20261018+`               | Session-restricted or self-denied admin credentials could mint broader child keys or touch root-derived accounts → Evaluates the actor's live effective permissions and self-denies, and blocks non-root admins from reading, mutating, or deleting root or root-derived credentials                                                                                                                                                                                          | Ensure IAM automation credentials hold full effective grants for policies they assign; manage root service accounts only as root                                             |
| Durable IAM revocation tombstones and scoped STS invalidation ([SN-2026-013](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-013))      | `20260916+` / `20261018+` | Deleted users/keys lacked durable tombstones across peer sites, while disabling one user could flush unrelated STS sessions → Persists and replicates IAM revocation records across peers, and invalidates only credentials derived from the affected principal                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Follow the [IAM Upgrade Guide](/operations/replication/iam-upgrade/) on multi-site deployments so old peers do not resurrect deleted accounts                                |
| IAM ZIP import status preservation and non-transactional execution ([SN-2026-025](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-025)) | `20261109+` / `20261112`  | Imports could re-enable `disabled` accounts or swallow group errors → Validates the entire policy file up front, preserves disabled user/service-account/group status, and reports group errors; the overall ZIP import remains non-transactional                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Export a backup (`mcli admin cluster iam export`) before importing and inspect the exit status and item report                                                               |
| OIDC asymmetric JWKS requirement and 4096-bit RSA cap ([CVE-2026-33322](/about/security-advisories/#cve-2026-33322))        | `20260321+` / `20261018+` | Accepted `client_secret` symmetric HMAC (`HS256/384/512`) ID tokens and unbounded RSA JWK sizes → Requires asymmetric JWKS verification only and rejects RSA keys larger than 4096 bits                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Configure your IdP to sign tokens with RS256/ES256 (RSA ≤ 4096 bits) and test OIDC login before cutover                                                                      |
| LDAP STS uniform errors, rate limiting, and long-DN login ([CVE-2026-33419](/about/security-advisories/#cve-2026-33419))    | `20260417+` / `20261026+` | Distinguished unknown users from bad passwords and failed group login when normalized DNs exceeded 255 bytes → Auth failures return uniform `InvalidParameterValue` with per-source rate limiting (`429 ThrottlingException`, `Retry-After: 6`), and long-DN group logins continue past missing optional local records                                                                                                                                                        | Honor `Retry-After` on `429` responses and configure `MINIO_IDENTITY_LDAP_STS_TRUSTED_PROXIES` behind reverse proxies so clients do not share one rate-limit bucket          |
| Source-IP proxy trust boundary ([SN-2026-018](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-018))                                     | `20260804+`               | Trusted client-supplied `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` / `Forwarded` unconditionally for `aws:SourceIp` → Adds `MINIO_API_TRUSTED_PROXIES` (`none` or trusted proxy/peer CIDRs); unset retains legacy trust-any behavior for compatibility                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Set `MINIO_API_TRUSTED_PROXIES=none` on direct deployments, or list exact reverse-proxy and cluster-peer CIDRs                                                               |
| External authorization plugin bounds and boolean check                                                                      | `20261109+`               | Unbounded external Access Plugin response size/latency → Caps plugin responses at `1 MiB` and `1 minute` and permits access only on an explicit boolean allow result                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Keep custom authorization webhook responses small, fast, and strictly boolean                                                                                                |
{.wide .expand}

## 3. Request Signing & S3 Object Authorization {#object-authorization}

| Scenario                                                                                                                                                                                        | Since                    | Previous Behavior → SILO Behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Impact & Action                                                                                                                                              |
| :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| SigV4 `X-Amz-*` `SignedHeaders` coverage and scope-date check ([SN-2026-011](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-011))                                                                          | `20260916+` / `20261112` | Permitted unsigned `X-Amz-*` headers or `Credential` scope dates differing from the signed request timestamp → Every sent `X-Amz-*` header (and `X-Minio-Replication-*` header) must appear in `SignedHeaders`, and the credential scope date must match the UTC request timestamp                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Standard AWS SDKs and `mcli` already comply; fix custom SigV4 signers or reverse proxies that inject `X-Amz-*` headers after signing                         |
| Header-only presigned upload SHA-256 verification ([SN-2026-012](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-012))                                                                                      | `20260916+`              | Presigned uploads carrying a concrete `X-Amz-Content-Sha256` digest could skip full body verification → Enforces exact SHA-256 verification against the uploaded payload                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Sign arbitrary browser uploads with `UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD`, or supply the exact payload SHA-256                                                                  |
| `STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER` presigned rejection and skew window ([CVE-2026-41145](/about/security-advisories/#cve-2026-41145), [SN-2026-023](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-023)) | `20260804+` / `20261112` | Accepted query-presigned unsigned-trailer uploads and skipped skew/unsigned-header checks on header-authenticated requests → Query-presigned mode is rejected (`SignatureVersionNotSupported`); authenticated requests enforce the 15-minute skew window and `checkUnsignedHeaders` (bucket-policy anonymous uploads remain supported)                                                                                                                                                                     | Use regular `PUT` or signed `aws-chunked` uploads for presigned URLs, and keep client clocks synchronized via NTP                                            |
| Snowball archive extraction pre-authentication ([CVE-2026-40344](/about/security-advisories/#cve-2026-40344))                                                                                   | `20260804+`              | `PutObjectExtract` could begin reading tar entries before completing authz → Authenticates and authorizes before `untar()`, rejecting unauthorized callers with `403`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Affects unauthorized requests only; authorized Snowball batch uploads work unchanged                                                                         |
| Unshadowed policy condition sources ([SN-2026-003](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-003))                                                                                                    | `20260804+`              | Raw headers or query params could shadow `s3:VersionId`, `s3:ExistingObjectTag/<key>`, `s3:RequestObjectTag/<key>`, or `s3:signatureAge` → Evaluates conditions strictly from server-verified version IDs, stored tags, and signature timestamps                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Prevents condition-spoofing bypasses; update test harnesses if they simulated conditions via forged headers                                                  |
| Explicit version deletion requires `s3:DeleteObjectVersion` ([SN-2026-010](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-010))                                                                            | `20260903+`              | `DeleteObject?versionId=...` and `DeleteObjects` entries with `VersionId` succeeded with `s3:DeleteObject` alone → Explicit version removals require `s3:DeleteObjectVersion` (evaluated per entry in bulk delete)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Grant `s3:DeleteObjectVersion` to version-pruning roles; add `Deny s3:DeleteObjectVersion` alongside `Deny s3:DeleteObject` in immutable-history policies    |
| `GET`/`HEAD` (local and active-active proxy) tag and lock header filtering ([SN-2026-022](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-022))                                                             | `20261112`               | `s3:GetObject` alone exposed `x-amz-tagging-count`, `X-Amz-Tagging` (`ACCESS`), or peer `X-Amz-Object-Lock-*` headers → Omits tag headers unless `s3:GetObjectTagging` / `s3:GetObjectVersionTagging` (with no explicit `Deny`) allows, and omits peer lock headers unless `s3:GetObjectRetention` / `s3:GetObjectLegalHold` allows                                                                                                                                                                        | Object body and standard metadata reads are unchanged; grant tag or lock read actions if clients inspect those response headers                              |
| Version-addressed reads, tagging, and `GetObjectAttributes` ([SN-2026-024](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-024))                                                                            | `20261112`               | Versioned reads/tagging could miss explicit version-action denies or actual version tags, and `GetObjectAttributes` missed dual action or zero-byte SSE-C checks → Explicit `s3:GetObjectVersion*` denies take precedence on `GET`/tagging (retaining legacy base-action grants when no version `Deny` matches); `GetObjectAttributes` requires both Attributes and GetObject (`s3:GetObjectVersionAttributes` + `s3:GetObjectVersion` when `versionId` is set) against actual version tags and SSE-C keys | Grant both `s3:GetObjectVersionAttributes` and `s3:GetObjectVersion` to callers using `GetObjectAttributes?versionId=...`                                    |
| Preserving `5xx` on tag-authorized read-quorum failures ([#294](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/294))                                                                                        | `20261112`               | When `s3:ExistingObjectTag/*` policies were active, drive read-quorum failures could evaluate against empty tags and return a false `403 AccessDenied` → Non-`ObjectNotFound` storage errors propagate as `5xx` (such as `503 SlowDown`)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | SDK retry loops now back off properly on transient quorum loss instead of aborting on false `403`                                                            |
| `ListObjectsV2` / `ListObjectVersions` (`metadata=true`) and tagging proxies                                                                                                                    | `20261112`               | Inconsistent per-version or peer-replica tag authorization → Ordinary metadata listing checks current-object permissions; `ListObjectVersions(metadata=true)` checks each version; active-active tagging proxies (`GET`/`PUT`/`DELETE`) authorize every present replica and fail closed on unreadable targets                                                                                                                                                                                              | Keep IAM policies synchronized across active-active replication sites                                                                                        |
| `CopyObject`, `SelectObjectContent`, and ZIP member views ([SN-2026-024](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-024))                                                                              | `20261112`               | Source reads could skip stored tags, `CopyObject` (`COPY` directive) could mis-evaluate destination request-tag conditions, and ZIP member views could bypass outer tags while persisting an index on disk → Authorizes stored source tags, evaluates `COPY` destination conditions on copied tags, and authorizes ZIP member `GET`/`HEAD`/listing against the ZIP's stored tags (plus `s3:ListBucket` for listing) using an in-memory index without mutating the ZIP                                      | Read-only callers can inspect authorized ZIP archives without write permissions; pass `x-minio-extract: true` at upload time if a persisted index is desired |
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## 4. S3 Reads, Writes, Encryption, Checksums & Select {#objects}

| Scenario                                                                                                        | Since                     | Previous Behavior → SILO Behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Impact & Action                                                                                                   |
| :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Corrupted or undecryptable `Range` read status code                                                             | `20260804+` / `20261018+` | Pre-first-byte bit-rot or decryption failures could commit `200`/`206` before aborting the stream → Failures detected before committing headers return HTTP `500`                                                                                                                                                                          | Clients will not cache truncated `206` bodies as valid partial content; alert on `5xx` and run `mcli admin heal`  |
| Indexed `Range` reads on compressed + server-side encrypted objects                                             | `20261112`                | Indexed `Range` reads into compressed `SSE-S3`, `SSE-KMS`, or `SSE-C` objects failed when the target S2 block started inside the first `64 KiB` encrypted frame (`decryptSkip > 0`) → Properly skips intra-frame prefix bytes without rewriting stored objects                                                                             | Existing compressed and encrypted objects become readable via arbitrary `Range` requests immediately upon upgrade |
| New SSE-C uploads and encrypted multipart size reporting                                                        | `20260903+` / `20261018+` | Combining SSE-C with server-side compression risked replica/size mismatches, and encrypted multipart sizes could reflect ciphertext bytes → New SSE-C uploads bypass server-side compression (historical compressed SSE-C objects remain readable), and `HeadObject`/`GetObjectAttributes` report accurate plaintext sizes and part counts | Compress payloads client-side before uploading with SSE-C if storage compression is required                      |
| SSE-C in-place key rotation and zero-byte verification ([SN-2026-006](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-006)) | `20260903+`               | Zero-byte SSE-C reads skipped customer-key verification, and in-place `CopyObject` key rotation could corrupt ciphertext or report source-key checksums → Verifies customer keys on zero-byte SSE-C reads/attributes and re-encrypts/checksums cleanly under the destination key                                                           | Ensure probes against zero-byte SSE-C objects supply the customer encryption key headers                          |
| Strict `X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption-Context` validation                                                        | `20261112`                | Empty, malformed Base64/UTF-8/JSON, trailing tokens, or non-string member values on `PutObject`, `CopyObject`, `CreateMultipartUpload`, or browser `POST` could return `500 InternalError` → Rejects invalid encryption contexts with `400 InvalidArgument`                                                                                | Verify custom KMS context headers encode a flat JSON object of string/null values in valid Base64                 |
| S3 Select `1 MiB` record size cap ([CVE-2026-39414](/about/security-advisories/#cve-2026-39414))                | `20260618+`               | Oversized CSV / JSON Lines records could trigger unbounded allocations or SIMD overreads → Enforces AWS's `1 MiB` maximum record size (`OverMaxRecordSize`)                                                                                                                                                                                | Stream objects larger than `1 MiB` per line directly via `GetObject` instead of S3 Select                         |
| Streaming trailer size cap and negative decoded length check                                                    | `20261112`                | Inconsistent handling of negative `X-Amz-Decoded-Content-Length` or truncated/oversized streaming trailers → Rejects negative decoded lengths and truncated or > `64 KiB` trailers                                                                                                                                                         | Blocks malformed streaming requests only; standard SDKs are unaffected                                            |
| Cross-pool historical self-copy and federated `CopyObject` ([#343](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/343))   | `20260916+` / `20261112`  | Self-copying a historical version from an older pool into a newer pool (including encrypted or multi-block S2 compressed objects) or federated cross-cluster copies could corrupt logical sizes or seek indexes → Preserves logical streams, encryption re-wrapping, checksums, and multi-block S2 seek indexes                            | Metadata updates and version rollbacks across expanded storage pools work without manual workarounds              |
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## 5. Multipart Uploads, Conditional Operations & Bulk Delete {#multipart}

| Scenario                                                                                              | Since                     | Previous Behavior → SILO Behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Impact & Action                                                                                                                               |
| :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Multipart part order, duplicate parts, and checksum combinations                                      | `20260804+` / `20260903+` | `CompleteMultipartUpload` could accept duplicate or out-of-order `PartNumber` entries → Rejects duplicate or descending part numbers with `InvalidPartOrder`, rejects `CRC64NVME + COMPOSITE`, and returns accurate `FULL_OBJECT` checksums plus `ChecksumType`                                                                                                              | Sort and deduplicate part lists in custom multipart clients, and tolerate `ChecksumType` in completion XML                                    |
| Multipart upload isolation, `Abort`, and stale cleanup                                                | `20261018+` / `20261109+` | Concurrent part retries, `AbortMultipartUpload`, and stale upload cleanup could hit lock-order deadlocks or timestamp skew → Aligns lock ordering and upload identity/timestamp tracking                                                                                                                                                                                     | Eliminates high-concurrency multipart hangs transparently                                                                                     |
| Retirement of experimental `20260916` `strict` multipart listing                                      | `20261018+`               | `20260916` offered an optional `strict` persistent multipart listing mode (1,000-entry cap) → Retired in `20261018+`; the setting logs a warning and falls back to the default cache/exact-key path                                                                                                                                                                          | Remove assumptions of restart-persistent `ListMultipartUploads` enumeration if you opted into `20260916` `strict` mode                        |
| Multi-pool conditional writes (`PUT`, `CreateMultipartUpload`, `CompleteMultipartUpload`)             | `20260916+` / `20261109+` | `If-None-Match` / `If-Match` could miss versions on another pool or treat unreadable pool metadata as "not found" and overwrite → Verifies authoritative state across pools and returns `503` when pool metadata is unreadable                                                                                                                                               | Expect `503` (with safe SDK retry) on conditional writes during drive/node outages even if `GET` still hits a healthy pool                    |
| Single-object conditional delete `DeleteObject` (`If-Match`)                                          | `20260916+`               | `DeleteObject` ignored `If-Match` → Enforces `If-Match` against the target object or addressed `versionId`; bulk `DeleteObjects` still ignores per-entry `<ETag>`                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Stop sending stale or placeholder `If-Match` headers on `DeleteObject` calls                                                                  |
| Single-pool `DeleteObjects` path containment ([SN-2026-020](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-020)) | `20261112`                | Single-pool bulk delete lacked uniform lexical `..` segment rejection → Rejects dot-segment traversal keys before storage path resolution                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Affects malformed `..` object keys only                                                                                                       |
| Sequential `DeleteObjects` path for explicit `VersionId` and locked `null` versions                   | `20261109+` / `20261112`  | Parallel fast-path bulk deletes could bypass cross-pool or suspended-bucket lock checks → `20261109` serialized version deletes in Object Lock buckets; **starting in `20261112`, every `DeleteObjects` entry with an explicit `VersionId` in any bucket (and unversioned deletes that can touch a locked `null` version) runs sequentially through the single-object path** | Large permanent version-purge batches take longer than unversioned delete-marker batches; increase client timeouts or use smaller batch sizes |
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## 6. Object Lock & Replication {#replication}

| Scenario                                                                                                                                                                            | Since                    | Previous Behavior → SILO Behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Impact & Action                                                                                                                               |
| :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Replication header signing and stripping ([CVE-2026-34204](/about/security-advisories/#cve-2026-34204), [SN-2026-008](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-008))                     | `20260417+` / `20261112` | Client-supplied `X-Minio-Source-*` or unsigned `X-Minio-Replication-*` headers could influence replica metadata → Requires SigV4 `SignedHeaders` coverage across `X-Minio-Replication-*` plus `s3:ReplicateObject` / `s3:ReplicateDelete`, stripping unauthorized headers post-auth                                          | Never send internal `X-Minio-Source-*` or `X-Minio-Replication-*` headers from regular S3 clients                                             |
| `PutObjectRetention` base and bypass permission check ([SN-2026-015](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-015))                                                                      | `20261018+`              | Shortening retention or changing lock mode could miss combined base + governance-bypass checks on edge paths → Requires both `s3:PutObjectRetention` and `s3:BypassGovernanceRetention` under the write lock                                                                                                                 | Ensure governance-override admin roles carry both `s3:PutObjectRetention` and `s3:BypassGovernanceRetention`                                  |
| Locked `null`-version protection in suspended or prefix-excluded buckets ([SN-2026-016](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-016), [#336](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/336)) | `20261018+` / `20261112` | Suspending versioning or excluding prefixes could allow ordinary overwrites, delete markers, or shadowed unversioned `DELETE` calls to replace or hide a locked `null` version → Blocks ordinary overwrites, delete markers, and permanent deletes against locked `null` versions across single-pool and multi-pool clusters | Retained or legally held `null` versions in suspended buckets cannot be overwritten under the same key until their lock expires or is cleared |
| Fail-closed `x-minio-force-delete` on bucket lock metadata errors                                                                                                                   | `20261112`               | Unreadable bucket Object Lock configuration could allow `x-minio-force-delete` to proceed without lock verification → Fails closed when bucket lock metadata cannot be read                                                                                                                                                  | Restore storage read quorum before retrying administrative force-deletes                                                                      |
| Target-side replicated `DELETE` lock enforcement and `COMPLIANCE` floor                                                                                                             | `20261109+` / `20261112` | Replicated permanent deletes or peer timestamps could bypass or shorten unexpired destination locks → Target-side replicated `DELETE` enforces destination retention/legal hold, and incoming peer timestamps cannot strip or shorten unexpired `COMPLIANCE` retention                                                       | Keep NTP clocks and retention policies aligned across replication peers; refused deletes surface in replication retry/failure metrics         |
| Per-field tag/retention/legal-hold ordering and default bucket retention                                                                                                            | `20260916+` / `20261112` | Shared coarse timestamps could let tag edits clobber lock state, and setting Legal Hold could skip default bucket retention → Tracks independent timestamps for tags, retention, and legal hold and applies default bucket retention alongside Legal Hold                                                                    | Prevents concurrent tag/lock overwrites on future writes; already-overwritten historical metadata is not reconstructed automatically          |
| Staged replica integrity checks, multipart checksums, and `resync` terminal states                                                                                                  | `20261026+` / `20261112` | Staged replicas lacked pre-commit SHA-256/SSE-C/`ActualSize` verification, and composite CRC multipart replicas omitted `FULL_OBJECT` type → Verifies content hash, SSE-C state, and compressed `ActualSize` before `renameData`, forwards `FULL_OBJECT`, and fixes `replicate resync` state reporting and MRF counters      | Upgrade source and destination clusters together and monitor `mcli replicate status`                                                          |
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## 7. Multi-Pool Storage, Listing, Migration & Healing {#pools}

| Scenario                                                                                                                                  | Since                     | Previous Behavior → SILO Behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Impact & Action                                                                                                                                          |
| :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Authoritative cross-pool reads, writes, and permanent deletes                                                                             | `20260916+` / `20261026+` | Partial pool visibility could return false `404` when a newer version lived on an unreadable pool, or remove the authoritative copy before stale pool copies → Returns `503` when unreadable pools cannot rule out a newer version, and deletes non-authoritative copies before the authoritative copy while protecting shared remote-tier references                                            | Treat `503` as retryable in clients and backup jobs; never treat a failed read or listing as proof of deletion                                           |
| Heterogeneous EC-layout `LIST` and uncertain-entry recovery                                                                               | `20261018+`               | Listing across pools with different erasure stripe sizes could drop uncertain entries or turn errors into empty pages → Confirms eligible uncertain `LIST` entries or returns an explicit error (no cross-page snapshot is promised)                                                                                                                                                             | Check error returns on every listing page before running downstream mirror deletions                                                                     |
| Empty-only directory cleanup after failed `renameData`                                                                                    | `20261109+`               | Failed write commits could either leave empty ghost directories or risk removing concurrent sibling versions → Removes only empty object directories during failed `renameData` cleanup                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Prevents ghost directories without risking sibling object versions                                                                                       |
| Pool `rebalance` metadata placement, tags, and stop convergence                                                                           | `20260916+` / `20261112`  | In-place replica metadata updates during pool draining/rebalance could misplace data or drop tags/delete markers, and `rebalance stop` could stall → Keeps in-place metadata updates on the authoritative pool (moving to an active pool only when encryption/checksum recomputation is required), preserves tags/markers, continues past single-bucket errors, and converges stop state cleanly | Avoid scheduling massive bucket re-encryption jobs concurrently with pool `rebalance`                                                                    |
| Pool `decommission` nested child-key rescan, bounded progress, and offline-drive check ([#334](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/334)) | `20261112`                | Coexisting parent and child keys (e.g., `a/b` and `a/b/c`) could leave child keys unmigrated, offline drives blocked emptiness verification, and zero-progress passes could loop indefinitely → Rescans hidden nested child keys, stops passes without physical progress with cancellation errors, and tolerates offline drives within each erasure set's read quorum when verifying cleanup     | Follow the updated [Pool Decommission Guide](/operations/deployments/baremetal-decommission-server-pool/); offline drives must remain within read quorum |
| `heal --dry-run` read-only guarantee                                                                                                      | `20261109+`               | Edge healing paths could still write metadata during `--dry-run` → Strictly prevents disk or metadata mutations during `--dry-run`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Safe to run `mcli admin heal --dry-run` for non-invasive health audits                                                                                   |
| Removal of private internode StorageREST `/rmpl` (`ReadMultiple`) ([CVE-2026-42600](/about/security-advisories/#cve-2026-42600))          | `20260618+`               | Exposed private `ReadMultiple` peer RPC → Removed `/rmpl` and added lexical path containment and allocation bounds across internode storage RPCs ([SN-2026-002](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-002))                                                                                                                                                                                        | Transparent to S3 clients, but prevents mixing upstream MinIO and SILO nodes inside one distributed cluster                                              |
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## 8. Bucket Configuration, CORS & Notifications {#bucket-config}

| Scenario                                                                                                           | Since                                  | Previous Behavior → SILO Behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Impact & Action                                                                                                     |
| :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Per-bucket CORS persistence and enforcement                                                                        | `20260903+`                            | Bucket `?cors` APIs were placeholders in upstream community builds and always fell back to global CORS → `PutBucketCors`, `GetBucketCors`, and `DeleteBucketCors` persist, export/import, replicate, and override global `MINIO_API_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGIN` for that bucket                                                                                                                              | Inspect existing buckets with `mcli cors get` before upgrading in case stale test CORS rules were stored previously |
| Serialized bucket metadata updates, stale-cache guard, and deletion tombstones                                     | `20260903+` / `20260916+` / `20261112` | Concurrent policy/lifecycle/tag edits could overwrite each other, `GetConfig` could overwrite newer config from stale cache, and multi-site config deletions could be resurrected by peers → Serializes writers under `metadata.lock`, guards `BucketMetadataSys.GetConfig` against stale cache overwrites, and supports opt-in `MINIO_SITE_REPLICATION_METADATA_TOMBSTONES` once all sites upgrade | Upgrade all replicated sites before enabling `MINIO_SITE_REPLICATION_METADATA_TOMBSTONES` consistently              |
| PostgreSQL and MySQL notification DSN requirement                                                                  | `20260903+`                            | Accepted legacy discrete host/port/user settings for SQL notification targets → Requires explicit `connection_string` (PostgreSQL) or `dsn_string` (MySQL) at startup                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Consolidate legacy SQL notification parameters into a connection string before cutover                              |
| NATS / AMQP setting registration and credential redaction ([SN-2026-019](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-019)) | `20260804+` / `20260916+`              | Rejected valid NATS/AMQP keys or echoed raw URI passwords in validation errors → Registers supported keys and redacts embedded credentials in error and debug output                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Update log parsers if they matched unredacted notification URI error text                                           |
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## 9. Lifecycle (ILM), Remote Tiering & Archive Restore {#lifecycle}

| Scenario                                                                                                                                                                      | Since                     | Previous Behavior → SILO Behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Impact & Action                                                                                                |
| :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------ | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Standalone `ExpiredObjectDeleteMarker` and exact-key all-version purge guards                                                                                                 | `20261026+` / `20261109+` | Versioned remote-tier expiration and whole-key purges could delete shared remote-tier blobs prematurely or skip standalone delete-marker rules → Delete-marker-only expiry preserves prior versions' remote-tier data; exact-key all-version purge re-verifies every version and refuses whole-key removal if any version is locked, tiered, or restored; standalone `DelMarkerExpiration` rules execute properly | Review ILM rules before upgrading to verify `DelMarkerExpiration` and all-version expiry prefixes match intent |
| Hiding internal remote-tier `FreeVersion` records                                                                                                                             | `20261026+`               | Internal `FreeVersion` tier-cleanup markers could appear in user version listings → Hidden from user-facing listings                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Cleaner `ListObjectVersions` output with no internal tiering markers                                           |
| Two-phase lock-free native restore (`POST ?restore`) and all-peer gate                                                                                                        | `20261109+`               | Remote tier restore held object locks across slow downloads and lacked explicit duplicate-in-progress semantics → Uses two-phase lock-free download/commit, returns `409 RestoreAlreadyInProgress` on concurrent duplicate requests, fixes restored-copy expiry precision, and **returns `503` on `POST ?restore` while any peer is unupgraded or unreachable**                                                   | Complete the upgrade across every cluster node and verify peer health before issuing `POST ?restore` calls     |
| Pre-`2024-04-28` `xl.meta` header and `UsesDataDir` revision normalization ([#332](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/332), [#344](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/344)) | `20261112`                | Partially healed pre-`2024-04-28` objects or expired restored copies could compute divergent metadata revisions across drives due to header version or time-dependent `xlFlagUsesDataDir` bits, splitting read quorum → Normalizes legacy `xl.meta` headers and clears `xlFlagUsesDataDir` from revision comparison                                                                                               | Resolves recurring quorum splits on aged historical objects automatically without rewriting stored data        |
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## 10. Batch Jobs (`expire`, `replicate`, `keyrotate`) {#batch}

| Scenario                                                                                | Since                    | Previous Behavior → SILO Behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Impact & Action                                                                                                                                  |
| :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Submitter-bound live authorization and mid-run revalidation                             | `20261109+`              | Submitted batch jobs ran under broad internal privileges even if the submitter was later disabled or narrowed → Binds jobs durably to the submitter, revalidates credential status and effective policies at start and during execution, restricts unavailable request-context conditions, and pauses/retries when an external authz plugin is temporarily unreachable                         | Submit long-running batch jobs using dedicated persistent admin service accounts rather than short-lived STS sessions                            |
| `SILO-BATCH` v2 manifest and report gate                                                | `20261109+`              | Unversioned / v1 batch manifests lacked submitter binding → Writes `SILO-BATCH` v2 manifests and reports; unfinished legacy jobs are not guaranteed to resume across the upgrade, and `20261026` or earlier rejects v2 records                                                                                                                                                                 | **Stop new batch submissions and drain or cancel all running, queued, or paused jobs before upgrading**; resubmit after all nodes run `20261112` |
| Per-version lock checks, contiguous progress, and `complete-with-skips`                 | `20261109+`              | Skipped locked/unauthorized versions could advance checkpoints past unfinished items or report plain completion → Checks locks and permissions per version, advances checkpoints contiguously, reports `complete-with-skips` when items are skipped, and runs a full rescan when resuming `replicate` jobs                                                                                     | Update batch monitoring scripts to inspect `complete-with-skips` and skip/failure counters                                                       |
| `keyrotate` KMS context persistence, metadata preservation, and `XLV1` → `XLV2` rewrite | `20261109+` / `20261112` | Batch key rotation could drop configured KMS Encryption Context, alter pool placement/tags/`Expires`, or fail on legacy `XLV1` objects → Persists KMS context across execution, retry, and reload (validating UTF-8 before rekeying), preserves pool, version, tags, multipart/tier headers, and expiry, and stream-rewrites legacy `XLV1` objects onto `XLV2` with sealed plaintext MD5 ETags | Review YAML job definitions against the updated [Batch Key Rotation Guide](/administration/batch-framework-job-keyrotate/)                       |
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## 11. HTTP Timeouts, Observability, Health Checks & `mcli` Client {#operations}

| Scenario                                                           | Since                     | Previous Behavior → SILO Behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Impact & Action                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| :----------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Absolute HTTP/1 request-header read deadline                       | `20260916+`               | Slow byte-by-byte headers could extend rolling deadlines indefinitely → Applies an absolute read deadline to HTTP/1 headers while keeping rolling idle timeouts for request bodies                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Mitigates Slowloris header stalls without affecting large streaming uploads; check idle pre-connected proxy pools                                                                                                                            |
| Dynamic webhook/Kafka logger reload and bad `queue_dir` safety     | `20261109+`               | Dynamic audit/logger updates could miss peer reload or panic on an unwritable `queue_dir` → Synchronizes peer reloads, returns configuration errors instead of panicking on bad `queue_dir`, and caps AMQP frame sizes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Verify cluster-wide logger status with `mcli admin info` after live config updates                                                                                                                                                           |
| Prometheus metric fixes and new diagnostic counters                | `20260903+` / `20260916+` | Inaccurate effective bucket-quota metrics, unguarded concurrent CPU collection, and missing MRF/IAM revocation counters → Retains `minio_*` metric names, fixes effective quota reporting and CPU collection concurrency, adds MRF drop queue-entry counters and IAM revocation sync metrics, and switches Console dashboards to Metrics V3                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Review custom Grafana panels and alerts (note that MRF drop counters count queue entries, not unique lost objects)                                                                                                                           |
| `silo healthcheck` vs. S3 data-path readiness                      | `20260903+` / `20261109+` | No built-in binary probe subcommand → Adds `silo healthcheck ready` / `live` / `cluster`; passing health probes does not replace signed S3 read/write verification                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Use `silo healthcheck ready` for container probes, and run bounded signed S3 read/write checks against every node during upgrades                                                                                                            |
| `mcli` config path, exit codes, move safety, and `{}` policy reset | `20260806+`–`20261112`    | Upstream `mc` read `~/.mc`, exited `0` on several partial failures, could delete sources on same-IP alias self-moves, and could not pass `{}` on access-key edits → Invoking `mcli` uses `~/.mcli` (`pgsty/mc` containers keep `/root/.mc` and pre-create `1777` `/.mc` for non-root UIDs); `cp`/`mv`/`mirror`/`rm`/imports return non-zero on item failures; `mv` rejects ambiguous same-scheme/port/IP moves; `mcli 20261112` accepts `--policy '{}'` to restore inheritance and enforces strict policy JSON decoding; adds read-only [`mcli checksum verify`](/reference/minio-mc/mc-checksum-verify/#command-mc.checksum.verify) | Copy `~/.mc` to `~/.mcli` once (or set `MC_CONFIG_DIR`) on hosts switching to `mcli`; check script handling of non-zero exit codes and growing `totalCount`/`totalSize` JSON progress fields; see [MCLI Compatibility](/compatibility/mcli/) |
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## 12. Embedded & Standalone Web Console {#console}

| Scenario                                                                                                               | Since                 | Previous Behavior → SILO Behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Impact & Action                                                                                                                                |
| :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-------------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Full administration UI retained                                                                                        | `v2.0.0+`             | Upstream pared community Console down to an object browser → SILO retains full cluster, bucket, lifecycle, replication, notification, tiering, IAM, IdP, KMS, and diagnostic administration                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Full browser administration remains built in; S3 APIs are unaffected                                                                           |
| Cursor-paginated object browser and single-page selection scope                                                        | `v2.4.0+`             | Loaded unbounded object lists for client-side sorting/select-all → Cursor pagination (default 100, options 50–1,000) with first/previous/next controls; **sorting, name filtering, and select-all apply only to the current page**; rewind and deleted-object views cap at 1,000 versions with truncation notices                                                                                                                                    | Use `mcli` CLI commands rather than browser select-all for bulk operations across thousands of objects                                         |
| Tri-state service-account inline-policy editor and validation ([SN-2026-025](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-025)) | `v2.7.1` / `v2.7.2`   | Metadata-only access-key edits could snapshot inherited policies as inline copies or accept empty policy variants → Tracks inherited vs. inline policies separately; metadata edits preserve inheritance; turning off **Restrict beyond user policy** sends `{}` to restore inheritance (requires `Server 20261112+`); blocks empty `{}` / `Statement` while restricted and renders save errors inside the modal                                     | Upgrade standalone Console deployments to `v2.7.2` alongside `Server 20261112`                                                                 |
| Permission-aware controls, explicit Governance bypass, and error fidelity                                              | `v2.4.1+`–`v2.7.2`    | Opaque permission errors, session logouts on transient network errors, and masked versioning errors → Reflects effective session capabilities, adds an explicit Governance bypass toggle, separates network/5xx errors from `401` session expiry, and surfaces wrapped S3 error codes (such as `InvalidBucketState`)                                                                                                                                 | Console API consumers can also read added `accountAccessKey` and `size: 0` fields                                                              |
| Restricted share-download proxy and native streaming ZIP ([SN-2026-014](/about/security-advisories/#sn-2026-014))      | `v2.4.1+` / `v2.5.1+` | Broad URL handling on anonymous share downloads → Restricts share-download targets to configured cluster endpoints and supports bounded streaming ZIP multi-object downloads with pre-byte S3 error status preservation                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Verify configured external Console/S3 URLs when running behind reverse proxies                                                                 |
| Live bucket inventory, folder usage scan, `1 MiB` text preview, and 10 UI languages                                    | `v2.5.1+`–`v2.7.2`    | Cached `account-info` bucket lists after create/delete, no bounded folder sizing, and EN/ZH only → Reads live bucket inventory (`Server 20261026+`), adds cancellable folder/bucket usage scans (working over plain HTTP and optional `usage-worker`), safe `1 MiB` text preview, 10 bundled languages including Arabic RTL, host-preserving `CONSOLE_SECURE_TLS_REDIRECT` on `0.0.0.0`, OIDC array group claims, and valid UTF-8 credential exports | Stop older standalone `console usage-worker` processes before starting `v2.7.0+` workers; see [Console Compatibility](/compatibility/console/) |
{.wide .expand}

## 13. Withdrawn Experiments & Non-Goals {#limits}

The items below either appeared briefly in development / a single release before being withdrawn, or represent boundaries that upgrading does **not** perform automatically:

| Item                                                                   | Current Status & Scope                                                                                                                                                                     | Practical Takeaway                                                                                                                     |
| :--------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Access-frequency inter-pool tiering                                    | Explored briefly after the fork and removed completely before `20260916`; never shipped in a public Server release ([removal record](/compatibility/access-tiering-removal/))              | Standard lifecycle expiration, remote object-store tiering (S3/GCS/Azure/SILO), `rebalance`, and `decommission` remain fully supported |
| Optional `20260916` `strict` multipart listing mode                    | Retired in `20261018+`; setting the switch logs a warning and uses the default cache/exact-key path                                                                                        | Do not build workflows assuming restart-persistent `ListMultipartUploads` enumeration                                                  |
| Experimental write-generation fencing (`consistency_strict` build tag) | Not enabled in published releases; request timeouts or lease loss do not prove underlying disk I/O has stopped                                                                             | Maintain standard erasure quorum and operational runbooks rather than assuming distributed write fencing                               |
| Automatic resurrection of lost historical metadata or policy clauses   | Repairs protect new writes, copies, key rotations, and policy edits, **without guessing or reconstructing tags, locks, remote-tier blobs, or `Deny` clauses already lost on older builds** | Audit critical buckets after cutover using `mcli checksum verify`, `mcli admin heal --dry-run`, and IAM policy review                  |
{.wide .expand}

## 14. Pre-Upgrade & Rollback Checklist {#upgrade}

Follow these five steps when cutting over from upstream MinIO or upgrading an earlier SILO deployment to **SILO `20261112`**:

1. **Verify disk format, quorum health, and rollout mode**: Inspect `.minio.sys/format.json` read-only (`xl` or `xl-single`) and run `mcli admin info` to confirm healthy read quorum across every pool and erasure set. Schedule a **coordinated full-cluster stop** when migrating from upstream MinIO or when upgrading a single pool whose erasure sets span distinct host subsets (typically ≥ 18 hosts) from `≤ 20261026`; pause concurrent S3 writes across multi-pool rolling windows.
2. **Drain background jobs and capture an offline recovery point**: Stop new Batch submissions and let running, queued, or paused Batch jobs finish (or cancel them). Record exact image digests / binary versions and rendered systemd / Compose / Helm manifests, export IAM and bucket metadata (`mcli admin cluster iam export`, `mcli admin cluster bucket export`), and capture a consistent backup of `.minio.sys` and config files once writes are paused.
3. **Audit configuration, policies, and external TLS/auth**: Replace hard-coded `/usr/bin/minio` paths with `silo` and pass `--set image.tag=RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z` with `helm upgrade --reuse-values`. Check custom IAM policies for bare bucket ARNs on the 12 bucket writes, `s3:DeleteObjectVersion`, `admin:ChangeMyPassword`, strict JSON syntax, and service-account inline restrictions; verify asymmetric OIDC JWKS (RSA ≤ 4096 bits), SQL notification DSNs, `MINIO_API_TRUSTED_PROXIES`, and external CA roots.
4. **Cut over atomically and verify the S3 data path on every node**: After `silo healthcheck ready` succeeds, run bounded signed S3 write, read, conditional, and `Range` checks **directly through every individual node** (covering representative multipart, encrypted, and compressed historical objects), then validate Console login, representative sub-user credentials, replication queues, and notification delivery.
5. **Resume background operations and reconcile multi-site policies**: Once every cluster node and replicated peer site is running `20261112`, resubmit Batch jobs, re-enable archive `POST ?restore` workflows, and verify effective service-account policies across replicated sites.
{.steps}

> [!CAUTION] Hard boundary for downgrades and rollback
> **Mounting existing disks in place does not mean you can swap back to an older binary later without restoring state.** Startup routines, background scanners, IAM edits (durable revocation tombstones and tri-state inline policies), `SILO-BATCH` v2 manifests, and bucket metadata tombstones update `.minio.sys` state in ways older MinIO or SILO binaries may reject or misinterpret. If you must roll back, restore your pre-cutover consistent backup across all participating nodes and replication peers together — never downgrade a single node's binary or image in isolation.

## 15. Audit Scope & References {#references}

- **Fork comparison baselines**: Server [`minio/minio@27742d469462`](https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/27742d469462e1561c776f88ca7a1f26816d69e2) (`2025-12-03`), client [`minio/mc@77f82e18b540`](https://github.com/minio/mc/commit/77f82e18b5401a65958f1619df6ebb994634bd88), Console [`silo-console@feff71e48e39`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo-console/commit/feff71e48e39547834399a84a9460edb4fb50563).
- **Current target stack (`2026-11-12`)**: [SILO Server 20261112](/blog/release/silo-20261112/) ([`44e848fedf8c`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/commit/44e848fedf8cec3d8c0da4b1aa8422390a2b7a8b)), [Console v2.7.2](/blog/release/console-2.7.2/) ([`0e7953ff59c4`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo-console/commit/0e7953ff59c4a1eb77c7d203b265e6783ff18d01)), [mcli 20261112](/blog/release/mcli-20261112/) ([`a37a9f054fba`](https://github.com/pgsty/mc/commit/a37a9f054fba828a0bbbceb4e9ff247ccf09c28d)), `silo-pkg v3.16.1` ([`433f7eefa714`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/commit/433f7eefa714a30b72ca70c4dffcd5faca25804f)).
- **Companion references**: [Compatibility Overview](/compatibility/) · [Component Version Matrix](/compatibility/versions/) · [Migration Guide](/compatibility/migration/) · [Native Package Migration](/compatibility/binary/) · [Server Audit Ledger](/compatibility/server/) · [MCLI Compatibility](/compatibility/mcli/) · [Console Compatibility](/compatibility/console/) · [Security Advisories](/about/security-advisories/).
